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I. INTRODUCTION

Although we would like to think of the separation of church and state
as the normal state of affairs, the light of history shows the marriage of
these two institutions to be the rule, rather than the exception. Egyptian
subjects saw their pharaohs as gods made flesh. The Roman emperors
ruled both the state and the church with an iron fist. So did the Russian
czars up to Nicholas II, who was recently canonized, along with his wife
and children, by the Russian Orthodox Church. Even today, Queen
Elizabeth II of Great Britain is the official head of the Anglican Church
and Pope John Paul II the monarch of the Vatican state.
With presidents acting on God's will, and cardinals investing the
church's money in the world financial markets for the greater glory of
God, it seems that rendering to God what is God's and to Caesar what is
Caesar's is much easier said than done.' With God and Caesar holding
each other in such a tight grip, the fact that courts often find themselves in
the middle of religious disputes should come as no surprise. However, in
a society where the separation of church and state stands as one of the
central constitutional pillars, this involvement brings serious concerns. By
getting involved too deeply in religious matters, the courts run the risk of
supporting one sect's agenda to the detriment of another, thus violating the
Establishment Clause and giving to Caesar what belongs to God.2 By
remaining completely aloof from any dispute with doctrinal overtones,
however, the courts might be, in essence, blocking an institution's basic
right to access to the courts, thus giving God that which is rightfully
Caesar's.
Concerns about God's and Caesar's bittersweet relationship run
particularly deep in the area of intellectual property. Jed M. Silversmith
and Jack A. Guggenheim discuss the interplay in detail.' They
acknowledge that intellectual property rights, by their very nature, are in
conflict with the U.S. Constitution's religious clauses.' By granting a
1. The irony of the interplay is perfectly illustrated by the exchange of money bearing
Caesar's face that occurs during virtually every religious service in America. It might be Caesar's
money, but on its face it reads: "In God We Trust."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

3. Jed M. Silversmith & Jack A. Guggenheim, Between Heaven and Earth: The
Interrelationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 467 (2001).
4. Id. at 470.
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person an exclusive right in property to a religious writing or mark, the
government may be interfering with another person's freedom to worship.5
This problem seems to be particularly troublesome in the area of
copyright law. In one of his articles, Thomas F. Cotter shows concern with
the way in which courts "fail to take seriously the needs of religious
believers to reproduce and distribute their religion's core texts for
purposes of their religious practice." 6 As he goes into a deep exploration
of the state of the law, he argues that the way in which courts give blanket
rights of distribution of important religious texts to certain sects
undermines what could possibly be termed as fair use by worshipers from
dissenting factions.7
Silversmith and Guggenheim seem to share Cotter's concern regarding
copyright law and how it appears to give too much protection to those who
hold the copyrights on core religious texts at the expense of the freedom
of those who might need those works to worship. Silversmith and
Guggenheim, however, do not believe that the problem of overprotection
arises in the case of trade name protection.8 They believe that, although the
absence of trade name protection cases dealing with the First Amendment
might be due to the fact that most of these trade name cases were fought
before the First Amendment was applied to the states, the opinions in the
decisions suggest that the courts took First Amendment issues into
consideration.9 Thus, while there might be a problem with copyright law
and its interaction with the First Amendment religious clauses, it seems
that religious freedoms should remain well protected as long as the courts
keep applying the genericness standard to religious trade name cases in the
way they have thus far.
The problem with trademark infringement actions, however, is that, by
their very nature, they are excellent harassment tools.'0 A perfect example
is the recent lawsuit that Fox News filed against Al Franken. Fox sought
an injunction to stop the distribution of Al Franken's "Lies and the Lying

5. Id.
6. Thomas F. Cotter, Guttenberg'sLegacy: Copyright,Censorship,andReligiousPluralism,
2 CAL. L. REv. 91 (2003).
7. Id.
8. Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 527. Although trade names are not the only
area of trademark law that may be affected by the potential conflicts between trademark law and
the Religion Clause, the authors only address the trade name issue. It is precisely this vacuum in
the literature that this Note attempts to address. Id
9. Id.
10. This is not to say that lawsuits are not used to destroy and intimidate in other areas of the
law. However, because of the grayness of trademark rights, it seems that a plaintiff in a trademark
infringement suit might be able to sustain what would look like a frivolous suit in hindsight.
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Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right."" Fox
argued that the use of the trademarked phrase "Fair and Balanced" in
conjunction with a picture of Bill O'Reilly on the cover of Al Franken's
book might lead people to believe that Fox was sponsoring the book. 2
After a mere 30 minutes of oral arguments, however, the judge disagreed
and held that the case was without merit, both factually and legally.13 He
held that "Fair and Balanced" is, if anything, a weak trademark and Al
Franken's use was considered parody and, thus, fair (although maybe not
balanced) use under trademark law.' 4
Although Fox lost this particular lawsuit, a smaller defendant with less
sophisticated counsel might not have fared so well. In fact, the looming
prospect of an unfavorable judgment might have led a less sophisticated
defendant than Al Franken to simply settle. 5 This possible outcome is
particularly unnerving if we realize that it might happen in a religious
context. A church plaintiff might be able to stifle a new doctrinal voice by
simply suing on trademark and forcing the fledgling sect to settle.
Although we would like to think that churches act in better faith than
media moguls playing hardball, other church motivations could push the
balance the other way. After all, who is more likely to try to stifle a
diverging point of view by all means necessary than a church that, bent on
a crusading frenzy, is convinced that a new sect may lead humanity further
into heresy? Again, let's not forget history...
On the other hand, we must not forget the legitimate interests of a
church in making sure that its reputation is not tarnished or the source of
its rituals confused with those of other denominations. The Catholic
Archdiocese of Atlanta seems to be precisely in that position. According
to the Associated Press, the Archdiocese filed a lawsuit against a network
of Spanish-speaking churches for misleading people into believing they
are a group of Catholic churches. 6 The faux-priests administer all
sacraments, including the Eucharist, and perform all Catholic rituals for
immigrants who mistakenly believe the churches to be associated with the

11. Phil Hirschkom, Fox Drops Lawsuit Over Franken Book (Aug. 25, 2003), availableat
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/25/fox.v.franken/index.html (last visited May 7, 2004).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. If the lawsuit were to merely focus on the trade name, the new church would be able to
simply select a different name. However, to the extent that trademark protection could be extended
to rituals, vestments, or symbols, some stifling might occur.
16. Associated Press, Church Targets "Fake" Catholics (Sept. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/19/national/main57432 I.shtml (last visited May 7, 2004).
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Vatican. 7 The Capilla de la Fe, as this church denominates itself, raises
"considerable funds" by engaging in the sale of holy objects and other
religious merchandise.' 8 Thus, if the Capilla de la Fe is taking funds that
people believe are going to the Catholic Church, then Capilla de la Fe is
using the Catholic's church goodwill (a precious and scarce commodity
these days), for its own profit. This case seems to fall squarely within
Caesar's realm. 9
Curious about the possible balance that God and Caesar may strike in
a situation like this and concerned about the lack of literature on the
subject, I decided to embark in an exploration of some of the relevant
issues. In this Note, I argue that, although protection for religious trade
names does not seem to burden any religious freedoms, this same
protection, if extended to rituals vestments and symbols, could have a
more encroaching effect on people's religious exercise. However, the
courts could use the doctrine of aesthetic functionality in trademark
disputes involving rituals, vestments and symbols in the same way that
they have applied the doctrine of genericness (that is, as a per se rule) in
some trade name cases, to ensure that some churches will not monopolize
rituals that are necessary to meaningful worship at the expense of other
sects. An unqualified per se rule, however, might destroy the rights of the
trademark holder if used indiscriminately.
The approach I suggest might be a cause of concern for some who may
think that churches will then have no protection against confusion.
However, because rituals of a particular faith are usually conducted only
at the particular church in question (unlike commercial products which
may usually be found in several retail store chains) rituals are less likely
to cause confusion than similarities among other product designs in
commercial contexts. In order for a set of rituals or vestments to cause
confusion, it seems that the potentially infringing church would have to
substantially copy more than just the rituals in question. Even then, a
different name in front of the church might be all it takes for the
parishioners to realize the difference. Thus, it seems that, in this case,
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. On October 3, 2003, the Fulton County Superior Court ordered a permanent injunction
barring the "Capilla de la Fe" network from portraying itself as Catholic. Upon any inquiry
regarding their religious affiliation, they must admit that 1) they are not part of, associated with,
or sanctioned by the Catholic Church; 2) that they are not ordained Roman Catholic priests; 3) that
any religious ceremonies or rites they may perform are not authorized by the Roman Catholic
Church. Staff and CNS Reports, Judge Issues Order in Capillade la Fe Case, GEORGIA BULL. (Apr.
21,2004), availableat http://www.georgiabulletin.org/local/2003/10/16/JudgeIssuesOrder/ (last
visited May 7, 2004).
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Caesar should not have much to worry about concerning trademark
protection.
However, other types of confusion, such as initial interest confusion,
could become more problematic as the use of televised and even Internet
services becomes more popular with church followers. More trademark
actions on rituals, vestments and other symbols are, then, likely to ensue.
Although bringing a suit on this kind of contention might border on the
frivolous, it might also be enough to chill a rival sect's free exercise of its
beliefs. Therefore, it seems to me that research in this area is becoming
more relevant.
Because of the glaring lack of judicial precedent or academic
discussion concerning this specific issue, I will first attempt to summarize
the state of the law regarding the religious clauses of the First Amendment
according to Silversmith and Guggenheim. Then, I will briefly describe the
doctrine of genericness, its standard commercial application, and the way
it has been used in religious cases, again, in light of the Silversmith and
Guggenheim article. After explaining why I think trademark actions in the
case of rituals are filed rarely, if ever, I will explain why I think these
types of actions may become more prevalent in the future under an initial
interest confusion standard. Then, I will explore the relationship between
aesthetic functionality and genericness. Finally, I will attempt to sketch a
way in which courts may employ aesthetic functionality to keep an
injunction based on a trademark claim from violating the Religion Clause.
II. THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES ACCORDING TO SMITH AND GUGGENHEIM

In their article, Silversmith and Guggenheim undertook the task of
exploring the interaction between intellectual property law and the
Religion Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution. In this part
of the article, I will give a brief overview of the article sections that are
relevant to the foundation of this work.
A part of the First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."2 This section, also known as the Religious Clause, has split into
three largely independent branches of jurisprudence.2 First, the Supreme
Court held that the Establishment Clause "forbids the state from
supporting a religion."2 The Free Exercise Clause curtails the state's

20. U.S. CONT. amend. I.
21. Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 471.
22. Id.
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ability to pass laws that "would interfere with an individual's ability to
practice religion." Finally, because of the nature of the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court has "developed a rule of judicial restraint regarding
intra-church disputes."23 The rule urges courts and legislative bodies to
"apply neutral principles of law to resolve these controversies."24
A. The Establishment Clause
Although formerly a powerful check on government action, recent
judicial developments have weakened the Establishment Clause. In Lemon
v. Kurtzman, the Court established a three-pronged test to determine if a
state's action would tend to promote religion." The three-pronged test
reads as follows: "[F]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion."' 26 The present Court,
however, seems to disfavor this test. 7 Although some justices maintain the
validity of the test, they seem to do so more in form than in substance.
A case that has had crucial effects on Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is Rosenbergv. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia.2S
In this case, petitioner sued student government for refusing to fund a
Christian magazine established by petitioner. Student government
responded that it was not allowed to fund religious activities and thus
could not fund a magazine with a religious message.2 ' The student
appealed the decision of the student government with the university.30
Then, the student filed a civil rights suit in federal court.' After losing in
district court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.32 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals.33 The Court
based its holding on the premise that "the government may not regulate
speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys. 34 The

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id.at 612-13.
Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 470.
515 U.S. 819(1995).
Id.at 825-26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rosenberg, 515 U.S. at 828.
Id.
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Court reasoned that student government, by providing funding for
publications, created a forum; then, by refusing to fund petitioner, it
refused him access to the forum. 5
The Court then held that funding religious magazines run by students
would not be against the Establishment Clause. 6 The Court stated that "the
guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government,
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to
recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are
broad and diverse."37 Thus, the Court made a distinction between an
activity that seeks a subsidy because of its religious affiliations, which
would violate the Establishment Clause, and an activity that seeks a
subsidy for other legitimate reasons, such as being a student journal, in
spite of its religious affiliations, which does not.3 It seems that, though not
overruled, the Lemon test "is not the controlling law relating to the
Establishment Clause."39 As long as a statute is applied in a neutral way
across the board, it falls within the requirements of the Establishment
Clause.4 °
B. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause has gone through much refining and finetuning in the last few years. Prior to the 1990s, the Supreme Court applied
what appeared to be a "compelling interest" test on any legislation that
interfered with religious activities.4" In one case, the Supreme Court held
that it was unconstitutional for a public employer to fire an employee for
refusing to work on Saturday in order to observe the Sabbath because her
decision not to work was based on religious beliefs.42
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the state penalized respondents for not sending
their children to the state school.43 Respondents argued that, as members
of an Amish community, complying with this government requirement
would go against express church directives.44 The Court held that, since the
statute was passed to prevent child labor, and Amish children work under

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rosenberg, 515 U.S. at 828.
Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 472.
Id.
Id.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id.
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the supervision and care of their parents, the statute did not serve a state
compelling interest and, therefore, violated the Free Exercise Clause.4"
In 1990, however, the jurisprudence took a turn away from precedent.
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, respondents were fired for using peyote." The state then denied
them unemployment benefits because of their "work-related
misconduct."4 7 The Supreme Court eventually held that the respondent's
First Amendment rights had not been violated.4 8 The Court reasoned that
criminal law was generally applicable and that "the government's ability
to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct,
like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend
on measuring the effects of
a governmental action on a religious objector's
49
spiritual development. '9
Three years later, however, the Court held, in Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah,that some local ordinances, which essentially made the
practice of Santeria impossible, were unconstitutional." The ordinances
forbade Santeria practitioners from making animal sacrifices.5 The
legislative history of the ordinances demonstrated that they were passed
for the specific purpose of making the practice of Santeria virtually
impossible. 2 The Court stated that laws that "target religious conduct for
distinctive treatment or advance legitimate governmental interests only
against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only
in rare cases."53 The Court found that these laws could not possibly pass
this standard.54
In an effort to revitalize the then-emaciated Free Exercise Clause,
Congress, in 1993, passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)." The RFRA declares, "government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest." In City of Boerne v. Flores, however, the Court

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Employment Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (1994).
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found the Act to be unconstitutional as applied to the states. Other
decisions, however, have acknowledged that RFRA may serve as a "selfimposed limit on Congress's power."56 Therefore, it seems that, unless a
law that burdens religion was designed to suppress a particular faith, it is
presumptively valid.57 It remains uncertain, however, whether RFRA even
applies to either the Copyright or the Lanham Acts. At least one court has
found that scenario to be unlikely.5"
C. Application of Neutral Principlesto Intra-ChurchDisputes
The Supreme Court has been involved in disputes triggered by the
splitting of a church into several groups that end up asking the Court to
"determine which group is representing the true faith" in quite a few
occasions.5 The Court has declared that these internal problems should be
solved by the church's own bodies;6" thus, giving to God what is God's,
while allowing Caesar, like Pontius Pilate, to wash his hands when his
intervention is not proper.
The seminal case in this area is Watson v. Jones.6 ' After the Civil War
ended, the Presbyterian Church required all members who had once
supported the Confederacy to repent of their sins before being allowed to
join the church again.62 The proslavery faction contested the election of
antislavery members to the important church positions and sued in
Kentucky's highest court.63 The court held that the church had violated its
own charter by keeping proslavery members from voting.' Other members
sued in federal court.65 The federal court, however, upheld the election
stating that the Court could not get involved in intra-church disputes.66
Other decisions have been fairly consistent with this precedent.67 The
Court's position seems to be that, in the absence of "fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness," it will not involve itself in church disputes.68 If the disputes,
however, may be dealt with through the use of general principles of
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 476.
80 U.S. 679 (1871).
Id. at 691.
Id.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Watson, 80 U.S. at 694.
Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 477.
Id.
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property and equity and are of secular concern, then Caesar has a duty to
get his hands dirty.69
III. TRADEMARK

LAW AND THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES

A. The Purposeof Trademark Protection
The purpose of trademark protection, unlike patent and copyrights, is
not to foster creativity or innovation. Rather, the rationale for trademark
law is derived from the Commerce Clause. There are two main policy
reasons for trademark law. Although they are inextricably intertwined,
they are, also, conceptually distinct.
The first policy rationale is consumer protection. By protecting marks
that the public associates with a particular source of goods, the government
makes sure that the public is not confused about the source of the goods
in question. By ensuring that the presence of trademark A on a box will
imply the presence of product A inside that box, the government saves the
buyer the trouble of having to guess what the product70 is. This makes
commerce more efficient by reducing transaction costs.
Because trademarks allow the public to identify a certain source with
a particular mark, the source has an interest in making sure that the mark
is not made less valuable as an identifier by the use of another. If another
party uses the source's trademark on its own goods, that second business
is not only confusing the public about the source of the goods but also
directly hurting the source's business by usurping the source's identity and
supplanting it in the market. Thus, the splinter in the consumer's foot
might very well be a stake through the trademark owner's heart.
It is perhaps for this reason that many courts involved in trademark
disputes focus more on the property rights of the trademark owner than in
the public's interest to be protected from confusion. Although this might
seem a purely academic distinction, it is actually at the center of trademark
jurisprudence. In fact, it is at the crux of trademark law and how it deals
with religious organizations.

69. Id.
70. The savings in transaction costs occur because the consumer does not have to spend time
and resources making sure that the box has the contents that the consumer is looking for. The
trademark serves as a shorthand to transmit all that information to the consumer.
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B. Trademark Law and Religious Organizations
1. Trade Name Disputes
The paradigm case for a religious trade name dispute occurs when a
few members of a church decide to leave the mother church because of
some doctrinal dispute.7 When the breakaway sect sets up a new church,
it usually wants to use part of the old church's name to identify itself.72
The original church will then, usually, either out of malice or due to a
legitimate concern with confusion, seek to enjoin the new sect from using
any part of the name of the mother church.73 Smith and Guggenheim
rightly conclude that injunction may violate the First Amendment.74
Furthermore, in the process of solving the dispute, the court will likely find
itself entangled in a sticky doctrinal polemic.
It seems, from Smith and Guggenheim's article, that most courts
dealing with trade names of religious or nonprofit organizations seem to
focus on whether the organization's name deserves protection as a
property right.75 As one court declared: "Nothing in the Constitution
prohibits a religious organization from owning property - and a
trademark is a property right - or prohibits the government from
protecting that property from unlawful appropriation by others."76
Although this quotation would suggest that religious trade names have
been treated in the same way as their commercial counterparts, the case
law suggests that the names of nonprofit organizations, religious ones
included, may sometimes be subjected to a different treatment.
For example, in ColonialDames ofAmerica v. ColonialDamesofState
of New York, there were three distinct organizations calling themselves
Colonial Dames.7 7 Although all of the organizations were run for the
purpose of preserving the memory of colonial times, they were run as
completely separate entities.78 Thus, Colonial Dames of America filed suit,
reasoning that patrons might be confused as to the organization they were
sponsoring. 79 The Court, however, found that there was no testimony that

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 505.
See generally id
National Bd.of YWCA v. YWCA of Charleston, 335 F. Supp. 615 (S.C. 1971).
Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames State of NY, 60 N.Y.S. 302 (N.Y. 1899).
Id.
Id.
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anyone ever joined one society mistaking it for any of the others.8 0
However, the Court seemed to substantially base its reasoning on the fact
that the organizations were nonprofit."' The Court stated: "[I]t is more
important that philanthropic work should be done than that any particular
person should have the gratification of doing it." 2 Thus, the Court found
the lack of a commercial use dispositive, making a thorough analysis of
consumer confusion unnecessary.
Notwithstanding the courts' traditional focus on the property rationale,
a case for reduced trademark protection for nonprofit organizations could
still be made under the consumer protection rationale. An argument could
be made that most people who care to join a church or nonprofit
organization will be sufficiently familiar with it not to be confused. In
nonprofit cases, the relevant audience for the purposes of confusion is that
composed of the members of the organization. When dealing with
commercial institutions, on the other hand, the relevant audience, which
is composed of the people who are likely to run into and potentially buy
the product, will be less familiar with the company that produces it. In that
case, the risk of confusion is higher, and the need for protection, therefore,
more compelling.
In order to determine whether the use of a name by a religious
organization infringes the trademark rights of another, the court must first
make two separate analyses. First, a court must determine whether the
name is merely descriptive or generic. 3 That is to say, are the words in the
name simply describing a set of beliefs? Second, the court must determine
whether the use of the name by the defendant is likely to confuse the
public in making it believe that defendant is in any way affiliated with the
plaintiff.

80. Id.
81. Id.at 304.
82. Colonial Dames, 60 N.Y.S. at 304.
83. Through their article, Silversmith and Guggenheim use the terms "generic" and
"descriptive" virtually interchangeably. The terms, however, are very different. A descriptive term
can become distinctive by acquiring a secondary meaning, even if it was merely descriptive at one
time. A generic term, by definition, can never be distinctive. A term that is considered generic in
one context may be descriptive or even inherently distinctive in another context. Therefore, it may
be distinctive and deserving of protection within that context, regardless of its otherwise generic
status in another set of circumstances (e.g., bird is generic to eagle but arbitrary as a trademark for
computers). However, to the extent that Silversmith and Guggenheim's analysis may suggest that
a generic term can ever become distinctive in the same category for which it is generic, their
analysis seems to be incorrect.
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a. Distinctiveness
A name can only be a trademark if it is distinctive. In Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc.,84 the Abercrombie court set out three
categories of names. These are 1) arbitrary or fanciful names, which have
nothing to do with the product they represent, such as "Kodak," 2)
suggestive names, which suggest a quality of the product but requires a
consumer's leap of the imagination to figure that out, such as "Tide" for
laundry detergent, 3) descriptive names, which merely describe the
product, such as "Park 'n Fly" or "Whopper" and 4) generic names, which
name the category
the product belongs to, such as "burger," for a
85
"hamburger."
Arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive names are found to be inherently
86
distinctive and, therefore, automatically protected under the Lanham Act.
Descriptive names are not protected unless there is a showing of secondary
meaning. 87 That is to say, after having been used in the market for a while,
the name, used in connection with the product, has come to serve, in the
mind of the relevant audience, as a source of identification rather than as
a descriptor of the product. For example, initially, the Whopper was
merely a descriptive name alluding to the size of Burger King's sandwich.
With time, however, this name has come to serve as a source identifier. If
one were to ask any random person what Whopper means to them in terms
of burgers, they will most likely think of Burger King before they think of
a humongous burger (maybe because there are much bigger burgers than
the Whopper in the market these days). Thus, in connection with Burger
King's flagship burger, we can say that the word Whopper has acquired
secondary meaning and, therefore, deserves trademark protection.
Generic names describe the class of products a particular item belongs
to. "Brush" is generic for brush, car for "car," "computer" for computer,
etc. Therefore, by definition, a generic name can never be protected as a
trademark, even if it were to acquire secondary meaning.88
The problem with trying to make these distinctions between the
different classes of names is that the tests are difficult to apply, since they
pose questions of fact particular to each case "and the trier of fact has the
formidable task of ascertaining on the evidence submitted the meaning of
the word among an indeterminate number of persons, perhaps millions. 89
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id.at9-11.
15 U.S.C.S. § 1052 (2002).
Id.
See supra note 83.
1 Jerome Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice 2.02[1], at 2-21 (Supp. June 2000).
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As if the special treatment that names for nonprofits seem to receive
was not enough to reduce their protection under the framework of
trademark law, several courts have gone even further and held that
religious names are "per se generic." As one court put it, religious names
must be generic because the name only describes:
First, the system of religion which it teaches; and second, that it
teaches that system through the medium of organizations known as
churches. It surely is not in a position to successfully claim a
monopoly of teaching this form of religious faith by means of
organizations known by the generic names of churches.9 °
The position held by many courts is well represented by that in
McDaniel v. Mirza Ahmad Sohrab.9" The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
defendant from making any use of the word "Baha" in any of its materials
because it claimed to be the only authorized representative for the Baha
religion.92 The McDanielcourt, in denying the plaintiff's relief, explained:
The plaintiffs have no right to a monopoly of the name of a religion.
The defendants, who purport to be members of the same religion,
have an equal right to use the name of the religion in connection
with their own meetings, lectures, classes and other activities. No
facts are alleged in the complaint to indicate that the defendants
have been guilty of any act intended or calculated to deceive the
public into believing that

. .

.(they are) affiliated with . . .the

plaintiffs. 93
In ChristianScience Board of Directors of First Church of Christ,
Scientist v. Evans, by far the most comprehensive case on the matter, the
Evans court reiterated the point it made in the prior case.94 The facts of this
case could serve as a model for the prototype religious trade name case. It
involved a breakaway church that desired to use the names "Independent
Christian Church," and "Independent Christian Science Reading Room."95
The Evans court held that the defendants could keep using the name of

90. New Thought Church v. Chapin, 144 N.Y.S 1026 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913).
91. 27 N.Y.S. 2d 525 (N.Y. Spc. Term 1941).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Evans, 520 A.2d 1347
(N.J. 1987).
95. Id.
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their church.9 6 The Evans court held that, even though the mother church
had always used the words "Christian Science" exclusively, they were,
nonetheless generic. 97
On the other hand, other courts have found religious names to be
source identifiers, entitled to all protections that trademark law may
provide. In Jandronv. Zuendel, a federal district court faced with the exact
same issue, found that "Christian Science Church" could only mean that
the church was in a bona fide relationship with the mother Christian
Science Church.98 Thus, defendant was enjoined from using the name
"Third Church of Christ Scientist" because it was remarkably similar to
plaintiff's usual names such as "First Church of Christ Scientist."99
Courts also take into consideration the context in which words are used.
In General Conference Corp. v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational
Church, the circuit court stated that "Seventh-Day Adventist" could be a
generic term when applied to the name of a specific church, because it
describes "a system or set of Bible-based Christian beliefs, doctrines, and
standards.' ° One, therefore, is not necessarily a Seventh-day Adventist
because of what organization he may be affiliated with, but rather, he is a
Seventh-Day Adventist because of what he believes."' 0 '
In Stocker v. General Conference Corp., however, the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB) held that the General Conference could use the
name Seventh-Day Adventist in its literature as a trademark."0 2 The TTAB
explained that, although the General Conference acted as a church, it also
offered a myriad of goods and services and, in relation to those, it could
use Seventh-Day Adventist as a trademark.
In Te Ta Ma Truth Foundation,Family URI v. World Church of the
Creation, a case decided last year, the court went even further in its
protection of the plaintiff's name, holding that protection of a church trade
name does not impede freedom of religion but rather helps people make
informed choices by avoiding confusion of sects.' 3 In other words,
trademark protection does not impede our religious freedoms. It actually
facilitates our exercise.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Jandron v. Zuendel, 139 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
99. Id.
100. Gen. Conference Corp. v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F. 2d 228
(9th Cir. 1989).
101. Id.
102. Stocker v. General Conference Corp., 95 F.3d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
103. Te Ta Ma Truth Found., Family URI v. World Church of the Creation, 297 F.3d 662, 667
(7th Cir. 2003).
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In short, it seems that courts used to be extremely reluctant to give
churches more protection for their names than it seemed necessary, thus
using the per se genericness doctrine when they saw some kind of First
Amendment issue looming in the horizon. However, this did not stop
churches from acquiring trademarks for their more earthly dealings in
products and services, a nice compromise between God and Caesar.
Today, however, churches seem to enjoy increasing trademark protection.
In some cases, the protection seems to be as broad as that granted to the
trademarks used in more typically commercial contexts.
b. Likelihood of Confusion
A court may enjoin the name of any organization, including a religious
one, if it determines that the use would carry a likelihood of confusion. A
likelihood of confusion is usually found "when the consumers viewing the
mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is
associated with the source of a different product or service identified by
a similar mark."
In Church ofScientology Internationalv. Elmira Mission of Church of
Scientology, there was a preliminary injunction ordered because the
defendant's use created a likelihood of confusion.'0 4 Again, this is a case
where the defendant used to be a member of plaintiff's organization but
later broke away. After defendant's secession, plaintiff sought to enjoin
defendant from using the word "Scientology" within its name.' The
ElmiraMission court found that if it were to wash its hands in the case of
someone who "loses its authorization, yet continues to use the mark, the
potential for consumer confusion is greater."' 6 Thus, the defendant was
enjoined from using its name.
Also, on the grounds of likelihood of confusion, several churches have
not been allowed to call themselves the "Polish National" church. In the
case of In re St. StanislausPolish NationalReformed Church of Scranton,
the church was ordered to change its name from St. Stanislaus Polish
National to St. Stanislaus Polish National Reformed Church, because the
national religion of Poland is Catholicism.' °7
The cases in this section appear at odds with those in the preceding
section. The reason for this seems to be that, in the preceding section's

104. Church of Scientology Int'l v. Elmira Missior of Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38,
59 (2d Cir. 1986).
105. Id.at 41.
106. Id.at 44.
107. In re St. Stanislaus Polish Nat'l Reformed Church of Scranton, 12 Pa. D 532,535 (1903).
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cases, the plaintiffs did not usually meet the burden of proving that they
had a valid trademark.° 8 This is not surprising because, as stated in the
preceding section, nonprofits seem to be held to a higher standard when
attempting to establish the validity of their names as trademarks. Once
plaintiffs prove the validity of their trademark, as the plaintiffs in the cases
in this section did, however, the test for likelihood of confusion applied to
nonprofit organizations seems to be the same as that applied in other
commercial contexts.
c. Trade Name Disputes and the Religion Clauses
In light of the limitations in trademark protection that courts use to
impose through its per se genericness doctrine, the fact that they treat
religious trade names just as regular commercial trade names should not
be troubling from a First Amendment perspective. Smith and Guggenheim
seem to be correct in asserting that the application oftrademark law should
be relatively straightforward under each one of the religious clauses.
(1) The Establishment Clause
As long as a court applies a rule neutrally and evenhandedly, it will not
infringe the Establishment Clause. Trademark law is neutral on its face. In
addition, any efforts that a court may make to give trademark rights to one
religion over another will actually help clarify their identities and, thus,
avoid confusion, which is the main goal of trademark law.
(2) The Free Exercise Clause
It seems that the mere grant of a name should not violate the Free
Exercise Clause, since there is no evidence that the Lanham Act was
passed with any religious group in mind, as long as it is done in a neutral
manner.'0 9 In any event, it seems that the state could argue a compelling
interest in making sure that the two groups are not confused.
(3) Neutral Principles of Law
This seems to be the only clause under which we may run into some
trouble. Since the paradigm case for a trade name suit in a religious
context, as stated above, tends to be that in which the breakaway church
108. Te Ta Ma, 297 F.3d at 662. Of course, in the Te Ta Ma case, not only was there likelihood
of confusion but there was actual confusion in the form of hate mail sent to the plaintiff, who was
mistaken for the defendant. See id.
109. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2002).
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used to be part of plaintiffs organization, the court will inevitably be
drawn into a doctrinal dispute as to whether or not the new sect is a true
follower of the faith or an apostate worthy of condemnation. However,
there is a way around this dilemma.
In Church of God at Markleysburg v. Church of God at
Markieysburg,"° the local minister persuaded the church to breakaway
from the mother church. The local church, however, was planning to keep
using the local building. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
they could not do that. Because the General Assembly's bylaws reserved
ownership of all church property in the General Assembly, the Court
declared that "a local congregation which is a part of a larger religious
organization cannot divorce or separate itself from the church family, set
up a new independent organization, and by so doing entitle itself to retain
the congregational property." The Court declined to get involved in
doctrinal disputes and stated that it could only examine the facts from a
legal point of view and would not interfere unless the congregation started
to use the property for purposes drastically different to those espoused by
the bylaws. In this way, the Court avoided stepping on God's toes.
Following that rationale, the Court enjoined defendants from using the
plaintiff's name as well.
Many other courts seem to hold that the right to use the name should
go with the property. They determine which side is the rightful owner of
the property. Then, based on that judgment, they award the name to the
winning side as well. Although perhaps not the most enlightened way of
solving issues from a doctrinal point of view, it is perhaps the most
solomonic way for courts to deal with these predicaments. By using
neutral principles such as property law, as their guide, and turning a blind
eye toward the religious questions in dispute, the courts avoid the type of
meddling in intra-church disputes that might render their decisions
unconstitutional. Lady Justice does wear a blindfold for a reason.
2. Ritual Disputes?
In trademark law, protection is not limited to names. Therefore, parties
will fight over more than just trade names. Many trademark cases are
about trade dress (the way a product is packaged, such as a Coca-Cola
bottle or a Pez dispenser) and product design (the color of a Post-It note
or the shape of a Goldfish cracker) as well. In my research, however, I
could not help but notice the absence of religious trademark disputes in

110. 355 Pa. 478 (Pa. 1947).
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these two areas. Of course, the first argument would be that a religion,
unlike a commercial enterprise, does not sell a product. But then again,
courts treat church names as church property so can we not analogize
religious rituals to commercial products and religious services to services
in the commercial sense?
a. Unlikelihood of Confusion?
Even if we accept that premise, there seems to be another reason why
we do not see many trademark lawsuits in this realm. Perhaps the
possibility of likelihood of confusion is, actually, rather unlikely.
Even if commercial enterprises have a family of products that they
would like to sell in combination (such as tennis shoes, rackets, jerseys,
balls, and sport bags... and indeed they may try) the harsh realities of the
market will probably push these companies to market their products
individually. Many of these individual products will be the only significant
connection a buyer may ever make between the product and its source.
That makes it very important for the seller to make sure that a competitor
will not use a trade dress or product design so similar to hers that it will
cause confusion among consumers.
In the case of religious sects, however, (for the most part, because in
East Asia people have a tendency to mix and match different rituals from
a plethora of religious traditions without giving it a second thought) it
seems that a ritual is not an isolated product but rather a part of the larger
purpose of the church: to spread its faith and save souls. To the extent that
a church may be analogized to a commercial enterprise, it can be said that
its rituals, rather than being isolated products, are instead part of the one
product the church is trying to sell: again, its faith. I do not recall seeing
a catalog of isolated rituals in any church manual (except for Catholic
churches urging people to go to Mass or confession, and this is usually
done to get people who are already members to participate in the product
they have already purchased, much as a personal trainer might urge us to
exercise correctly at the gym for which we have bought a yearly
membership). The only ritual most churches urge non-members to
participate in is baptism (of course, I am speaking mostly about Christian
sects now). That is because, by participating in baptism, one is essentially
signing a contract for the purchase of salvation. Therefore, any other
rituals that one may get involved in will probably happen after one has
already become part of the church. The result of this is that, just like with
other nonprofit organizations and secret societies, the purchaser has to
become too familiar with the structure and doctrine of the church before
partaking in any ritual to make confusion likely.
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Not only do churches, in essence, sell their products and services in a
package; they are also, for the most part, the exclusive distributors of such
products and services. No licensing or franchising is likely to occur.
Therefore, it is probable that most members of the public, even if they are
not members of the particular church in question, will come to identify the
rituals and liturgies offered by the church with that church itself and no
other. Furthermore, church "products" come in such a tight bundle that any
small difference in the performance of the religious rites as a whole,
between the owner of the trademark and the potentially infringing party
(such as the ministers' vestments, the liturgy, or the name of the church
itself) is likely to clue the public into realizing that this church is not in
association with the one it is so similar to, thus, making confusion as to
source unlikely.
Therefore, it seems that, in order for a likelihood of confusion to occur
in a religious scenario not involving a trade name, the infringing religious
organization must copy an overwhelmingly substantial amount of the
features of the plaintiffs church. Even then, it seems the only way a
church could pull that off would be by intentionally attempting to mislead
the public into believing that they are indeed the plaintiff church. This is
called fraud, a charge that brings consequences of a substantially more dire
nature than trademark infringement actions, thus, probably making the
trademark action seem trivial.
The preceding analysis assumes that it is necessary for people to be
confused throughout the whole process of purchase and use of the product
in order to trigger a likelihood of confusion. The law, however, recognizes
other types of confusion as well. One type is initial interest confusion.
Initial interest confusion occurs when someone uses another's trademark
"in a manner calculated to capture initial consumer attention, even though
no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion."' This
usually happens when someone packages their product in a manner so
similar to another's trademark that a consumer will come by and grab the
product thinking it comes from the trademark holder. Upon closer
examination, the consumer will realize that the product does not come
from the trademark holder. The product is so similar to that made by the
trademark owner, however, that the consumer will find it easier to buy the
new product than to go back to find the one she had in mind in the first
place."12
111. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)
(citing Mobil Oil Corp v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1987)).
112. For a more thorough explanation and analysis of initial interest confusion, see id.;
Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp. 17 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 9

It may seem ludicrous to think of initial interest confusion as a
legitimate cause of action from a church's point of view. As the twentyfirst century advances, however, more and more religious services are
available on TV and even through the Internet. In these kinds of mediums,
all those characteristics that protect churches from confusion (e.g.,
separate building, prominent name on the door), would tend to disappear,
making a minister's vestments or the form of a ritual on a computer
monitor or TV screen the first thing that one might encounter when
flipping the channels or surfing through web sites. Is it not possible for a
powerful church to allege that a rival sect is confusing people enough to
make followers tune into the rival church because it "looks like" the bigger
or older church? To some, this might seem a hard case to make in court.
However, it may be enough to dampen the fervor with which some. might
be willing to express their faith and engage in activities related to their free
exercise of religion.
We must remember that life is stranger than fiction, and when it comes
to law, if it can be conceived, there is always an entrepreneurial lawyer
willing to bring it to court. Therefore, it seems that asking the following
questions is indeed a valid exercise: What would happen if a court found
a ritual to cause a likelihood of confusion? May a court then enjoin the
party from practicing such a ritual? What about the right to practice one's
religion? Just as the courts have sometimes applied a per se generic test to
religious trade names, they could adopt a test of per se aesthetic
functionality when it comes to rituals. Before delving into the application
of aesthetic functionality to rituals, it may be helpful to explore the
doctrine in further detail.
b. Aesthetic Functionality?
Aesthetic functionality came into the public light with Pagliero v.
Wallace, which concerned the design of a china set."' The Paglierocourt
held that the design's aesthetic appeal, "which was an important ingredient
in the commercial success of the product" rendered the feature functional,
and thus, not qualified for trademark protection." 4 Because of the
broadness of the test, some courts rejected aesthetic functionality
completely. "5 According to Professor Thurmon, it seems that the Pagliero
test was wrong not so much in its acknowledgment of aesthetic

113. Pagliero v. Wallace, 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
114. Id.
115. Newton's third law of motion (and, I contend, of jurisprudence): For every action there
is an equal and opposite reaction.
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functionality, but rather in the breadth of its standard." 6 Just because "an
important ingredient in the commercial success of a product" gives one a
competitive advantage, it does not mean that competitors need to use that
feature. Again, as Professor Thurmon puts it: "Only by evaluating
alternative designs can a court accurately determine the competitive
significance of a particular feature or design."' 7 In the end, courts started
to move toward a single functionality test both for aesthetic and utilitarian
functionality, where competitive need is the standard.
All of this changed, however, after the Supreme Court rendered its
Traffix decision in 2001.11' Because of the all-encompassing nature of this
decision, and the way it has shaken the foundation of functionality
jurisprudence, it will suffice to say, for our purposes, that the Traffix
decision revived the distinction between utilitarian and aesthetic
functionality, keeping the old competitive need standard for aesthetic
functionality and making utilitarian functionality the equivalent of
trademark nullification." 9 Because the Traffix decision made the
boundaries between aesthetic functionality and utilitarian functionality so
uncertain and, at the same time, so crucial for the determination of
trademark rights, it seems to me that, in order to make sure that both
trademark protection and the First Amendment are given their dues, a
court might adopt a per se aesthetic functionality rule in the case of
disputes concerning rituals. Although, given the chaotic and at times
volatile state of the functionality doctrine, this seems a rather arbitrary
assumption, yet there are two reasons why it can be made.
First, at least from a legal and materialistically utilitarian point of view,
rituals can be said to be useless except to the extent that they may appeal
to those participating in them. They serve no tangible, quantifiable
purpose, and their effectiveness is not scientifically falsifiable because
they are not objectively real. Their effects seem to exist only in the minds
of the participants. Therefore, courts would be very unlikely to find rituals
functional in the utilitarian sense.
Second, even if a court wanted to involve itself in the task of
determining whether the functionality of a ritual is aesthetic or utilitarian
(or whether it is functional at all), such a determination would
automatically require a court to get involved in doctrinal issues that are
beyond its constitutional domain. How is a court to evaluate the function

116. Mark A. Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of TrademarkLaw's FunctionalityDoctrine,73
FLA. L. REv. 243, 306 (2004).
117. Id. at307.
118. See generally Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
119. See id.
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of a ritual: Evidence of souls saved per performance? Effect on the
person's spirit or karma? The suggestions might seem somewhat
humorous but they underline the basic problem with these cases. Courts
become entangled in the details of ritual administration and purpose, and
which courts are to decide these issues? Therefore, a per se rule is more
likely. For these reasons, I believe that courts might possibly adopt a rule
close to a per se aesthetic functionality rule in respect to rituals.
c. Ritual Disputes and the Religious Clauses
(1) Establishment Clause
It seems that the analyses do not change much from those made under
the trade names section. As long as a court applies its principles neutrally
and evenhandedly, there is no reason why the Establishment Clause should
be violated.
(2) Free Exercise Clause
As discussed above, it is in this area that the tensions between
trademark law and religious freedoms may reach their higher levels.
Aesthetic functionality would function as a valve through which any
excessive pressure imposed on the Free Exercise Clause by trademark
protection may be released. This must be done without deflating trademark
protection so much that it becomes an empty shell. Striking a balance may
become problematic. If a court forbids a church the performance of a
particular ritual simply on the grounds that it may cause confusion, then
it could be infringing the Free Exercise Clause. On the other hand, if it
fails to protect some particularly distinctive rituals on the basis that they
are aesthetically functional, the likelihood of confusion may increase
dramatically.
In the unlikely case of finding secondary meaning and likelihood of
confusion in the defendant's use of the trademark, the defendant could still
end up retaining use of the ritual, vestment, or symbol during religious
celebrations because of the use of a per se aesthetic functionality rule. The
defendant could also retain use of a symbol in other areas such as
marketing religious merchandise if it could prove competitive need, just
like in any other commercial case of aesthetic functionality. As noted
above, the likelihood of confusion in religious contexts, other than those
involving church names should be minimal. Therefore, if there is a
likelihood of confusion, it is very likely that a minimal change on the
infringing ritual, mark or symbol could be made, minimizing confusion
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without altering its functionality. In that case, the court could order the
defendant to carry out such changes as a matter of equity.
It is plaintiffs burden to prove secondary meaning, a potentially
daunting task when it comes to religious situations. By combining that
with a rule of per se aesthetic functionality for rituals, vestments and
symbols used during religious services, the Free Exercise Clause should
be well guarded from Caesar's pressure. In other circumstances where the
defendant church is acting more like any other commercial enterprise, then
it should be the defendant's burden to prove aesthetic functionality in that
case as well. In this way, both defendant's right to worship and plaintiff's
trademark rights are protected. The problem with attempting to make such
distinctions, again, is: How can a court determine which use is religious
and which use is not?
(3) Neutral Principles of Law
As noted above, the problem with rituals is that, if characterized as
products, a determination of functionality must be made. This
determination would inevitably involve a court in the resolution of
doctrinal disputes that go beyond the realm of constitutional judicial
action.
The alternative approach would be to make the per se functionality rule
apply only when the rituals, vestments, and symbols are used during
religious services. In other words, the infringing church would only be
allowed to use the rituals, symbols and vestments for noncommercial
purposes. However, by creating a rule of per se aesthetic functionality that
only applies to religious services or noncommercial activities, we bring
courts back around the circle of doctrinal meddling. What is a religious
service? What is necessary to the followers of the church in a doctrinal
sense and what is simply a commercial activity for the earthly benefit of
the institution? Are these activities really necessary? Are they distinct and
severable from the religious ones? How do we know? Do we just take the
worshipers' word for it? Do we engage in the secular creation of a
standard for religious use? These are questions that would very likely
drown the courts in the waters of the religion clauses from which we were
trying to save them in the first place. As wise and able as Caesar may be,
he is not the one who walked on water.
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Unless, someone finds a way to solve these issues without engaging in
doctrinal analysis (the possible subject of another paper), 2 ° the former
approach (the per se rule) remains the best alternative. Although this might
result in possible under-protection of trademark rights, we must keep in
mind that confusion in this realm remains so unlikely that, in reality, the
trademark rights should not suffer much.

IV. CONCLUSION

Intellectual property and the First Amendment, although not
completely irreconcilable, serve different masters in distinct manners.
Intellectual property assigns exclusive rights to specific individuals, while
the First Amendment grants freedoms to all. Although the conflicts
between these two aspects of the law tend to look obvious in hindsight,
they are hardly ever foreseeable. By the same token, even though the
possibility of a lawsuit on trademark involving rituals, vestments and
symbols seems to be rather small, the way in which churches are
increasing their use of technology makes these lawsuits more likely in the
future. By exploring the use of theories already in place in possible future
scenarios, such as aesthetic functionality in religious trademark litigation,
we help make sure that, once these conflicts start to happen more often,
they are resolved in ways that do not infringe the rights of any of the
parties involved. It is true that the doctrine may leave many questions
unanswered. However, it is better to acknowledge the limits of the system
than to burden it with impossible tasks. It is not the task of the law to find
all the answers to every question, but rather, to determine the party best
suited for the task in order to promote efficiency as well as justice. In this
case, the key is to strike a balance between trademark protection and
religious freedoms in order to reach a point that might foster not just a
compromise but perhaps even synergy between both. It is critical to give
to God what is God's and to Caesar what is Caesar's.

120. Again, my contention is not that a standard that might distinguish between religious uses
and commercial uses by a church is impossible to articulate. Rather, it seems that it would be too
costly and problematic to be worth the trouble. This, however, is only my impression. The
possibility of a solution may look more favorable if seen under the light that further study might
cast upon it.

